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The article delineates the main methodological deficiencies and datasets available for comparing income inequality at the European and world level. The article is divided in two parts. In the first part of the article, I present the main datasets and methodological deficiencies when trying to compare income inequality in the world. Although efforts have been made in the last decades to generate comparative databases, the qualities of some indicators are rather doubtful and also there is no common ground on conceptualizing inequality indicators and measuring them, some of which are income-based, while others are household expenditure-based. Then, I present two classical studies on studying income inequality after the Washington consensus. In the second part of the article I sketch an overview of rising income inequality in Romania after 1989 by presenting some income inequality indicators and comparing them with other former CEE countries. However, I will pinpoint that Romania's case is rather exceptional in the EU and, when comparing standard income inequality indicators, further explication needs to be delivered. I conclude that while income inequality is the result of macro-structural changes that occurred during the transition to market capitalism, political decisions are not to be played-down.
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Introduction
Income inequality growth in Romania is the result of macro-structural changes which occurred during the postsocialist transition to market capitalism, although, as I will show during this article, the transition itself cannot be the main cause for income inequality growth. A quarter of a century after the fall of the socialist regimes, income inequalities grew without exception in all former socialist countries, most of them being now members of the European Union (EU). If in 1989, the average Gini coefficient 1 for the 12 countries that joined EU in the 2004 and 2007 waves was 22 (Bandelj and Mahutga 2010b) , in 2014 it rose to 31. Romania is among the most unequal member states in the EU with a Gini coefficient of 37.4 in 2015, close to Bulgaria (37), but well above the EU average of 31. During the recent economic crisis, Romania experienced the `largest drop` of the Gini coefficient in the EU (from 38.3 in 2007 to 33.5 in 2011) due to wage cuts in the public sector and shrinking profits from the real estate market (Domnișoru 2014) . Once wages were restored and the economy returned to economic growth, the Gini coefficient raised again to 37.4 in 2015, only before Lithuania.
The present article aims to schematically discuss the methodological deficiencies for measuring income inequality and also causes of income inequality in Romania, although comparisons with other countries from EU will also be used. I will present the main sources of data used in this study, the methodologies for measuring income inequality (and also a critical engagement with this methodologies), as well as two classical studies measuring the latter. I will engage with Thomas Piketty's seminal work on the long-term tendency of capitalist systems to produce income inequality to understand how the latter can be favoured by political decisions and not only by market forces. Then, I will particularize this argument to CEE countries and critically interrogate Kuznets theory regarding rising income 1 The Gini coefficient measures the extent to which the distribution of income within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A coefficient of 0 expresses perfect equality where everyone has the same income, while a coefficient of 100 expresses full inequality where only one person has all the income.
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Data sources in measuring income inequality
In the last decades many efforts have been made to build comparative data sources at European/world level to measure income inequality. The largest project to build such a database belong to the World Bank consultants, Klaus
Deininger and Lyn Squire. In the mid-1990s, they published a collection of 682 `high quality` Gini coefficients for 108 countries (out of the 220 countries), of which two thirds are taken from primary sources (official government statistics or data published by prestigious international agencies) (Deininger and Squire 1996, 572) . The remaining 35% are data obtained, according to the authors, from reliable secondary sources (research surveys). Even so, the number of high-quality Gini coefficients represents only one-quarter of the 2,621 cases for which the two economists have processed data. Thus, the coefficients are spread unevenly for the 220 countries compiled in the database and in many cases the information is scarce or absent. These are not the only shortcomings of the database compiled by the two researchers. James Galbraith (2016, 126) Gini coefficients, 5,690 observations on income distribution by quintile shares, and 5,006 observations on income distribution by decile shares 4 .
As with the data compiled by Deininger and Squire, no common concepts have been identified and comparability of coefficients remains low.
The value of this database, as the one compiled by Deininger and Squire, is that they `are vital depositors of past studies rather than updated comparative datasets [...] They are compilations done by hundreds of research teams around the world over the years` (Galbraith 2016, 126 between 5 and 50%. Moreover, income from household production represented 17% of household income on average, while for other countries the share does not exceed 2% (Paats and Tiit 2010, 187) . Even in these circumstances, which makes Romania an exceptional case in the EU, the incomes computed based on own-consumption decreases the value of the Gini coefficient by at least 4 percentage points (ICCV 2010, 34) .
Describing the results of the EU-SILC survey, Eurostat acknowledges that the case of Romania is rather particular when assessing the income from own-consumption. The report admits that `in Romania few questions have been used: from those who own land or are involved in production for own consumption, questions are asked about the field of agricultural activity and the extent of producing for their own household` (Paats and Tiit 2010, 184) .
Also, for measuring the income obtained from own-consumption `there is no information available about the method used` (Paats and Tiit 2010, 184) . As a consequence, the Gini coefficient reported by EU-SILC is higher than the one reported by the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) (which includes ownconsumption).
Neoliberalism and income inequality: the winners take too much and the losers are to numerous`5
In his seminal work ` Capital in the Twenty-First Century `, Thomas Piketty (2015) notes the long-term tendency of capitalist systems to produce income inequality and, above all, wealth inequality. According to Piketty, this is possible due to a fundamental law of capitalism, r > g, where r represents the rate of return on capital, and g represents the rate of economic growth.
As long as r is higher than g, there is a tendency to concentrate wealth and to income inequality growth. The French economist defines capital as the sum of both physical capital (equipment, buildings, real estate, land, etc.) and wealth, whether productive or not. A fundamental problem with the law described by Piketty is that he never explains where this rate of return on 5 The subtitle is taken from (Hoffer, Laliberté, and Gross 2013, 3 Sweden, Japan, and Canada. The strength of his study is that the data used reflect a long period of time (from the 18th century for many countries) and that it focuses on detailing the richest 10, 1 and 0.1% (and even 0.01%) of the income distribution. The method used is the analysis of income and wealth statements.
According to Piketty's argument (2015) , income and wealth inequalities would grow during periods of dis-embedded capitalism, that is, We have a better overview of growing income and wealth inequality if we look at the first 1% of the hierarchy (Figure 3 ). And in this case, the concentration of national income is visible in all the countries for which we have data available. For the Anglo-Saxon countries, we see almost a tripling of the share in national income detained by the first 1%. More importantly to be discussed is the ratio between the share of income and wealth owned by the top decile and the first 1% from this decile.
If we compare the two sets of data, we notice that, for example, in the case of the United States of America, the top 10% of the income distribution accounts for half of the national income, but almost half (22%) is owned by the first 1%. In the case of Great Britain, the share of the top decile in national income is 40%, but 14% is owned by the first 1%. In China, the share of the top decile in national income is 37%, but almost one third is owned by the first 1% (11.4%). Therefore, as a first remark, it is important to note that after 1980, the share of the top decile's income in national income has increased in all high-income countries studied by Piketty. Also, the main indicator of inequality often used is the interdecile ratio P90/10 that is, the ratio between the ninetieth percentile of the income distribution and the tenth percentile. However, this indicator omits to consider the income distribution beyond the ninetieth percentile. Thus, the inter-governmental reports and statistics ignore the top of the distribution and provide no information on incomes inside the top decile (Piketty 2015, 442) , as the first 1% can hold between one-third and a half of the income in the last decile, as shown above.
A popular theory for explaining income inequality growth in highincome countries is the marginal productivity theory and the relationship between technological change and education. According to this very popular theory among Anglo-Saxon economists, wage growth reflects `technical advances in favour of high qualifications, which has made the productivity of the most skilled employees grow much faster than average productivity` (Piketty 2015, 518) . This means that technological changes have imposed a certain level of higher qualifications which has in turn led to an increase in employee productivity, compared to those in other sectors of the economy less intensive in skills. But as Piketty shows in his study, income inequality growth in the Anglo-Saxon countries is much more pronounced than that of Western European states or Japan, which are at the same level of technological development. As Piketty remarks (2015, 530):
'The divergence between the various regions of the wealthy world is all the more striking because technological change has been the same more or less everywhere: in particular, the revolution in information technology has affected Japan, Germany, France, Sweden, and Denmark as much as the United States, Britain, and Canada. Similarly, economic growth-or, more precisely, growth in output per capita, which is to say, productivity growth-has been quite similar throughout the Social Change Review ▪ Winter 2017 ▪ Vol. 15(1-2): 55-82 wealthy countries, with differences of a few tenths of a percentage point' (Piketty 2015, 530) .
Thus, explaining income inequality between the high-income states, but above all the differences in income distribution within them, must also consider the political and ideological apparatus that most often justifies these income inequalities.
At the other side of the income distribution more people are at risk of (Deaton 2017, 257) . Thus, despite the high pace growth that many developing countries experience, we are still living in a world where the poorest three-quarters of the world population share 20% of the world income, the same share as the top 1.7% (Hoffer, Laliberté, and Gross 2013, 6 ).
Restraining our argument to EU, the number of people at risk of The number of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). been a series of cutbacks in public spending, mainly social spending and funding for social services, resulting in an accentuated growth of socioeconomic inequalities, social insecurity and precariousness, especially toward the bottom of the income structure (Sassen 2014 ).
Kuznets's theory meets Central and Eastern Europe
One of the well-known theories to explain income inequality belongs to the economist Simon Kuznets. In his article from the mid-1950s, Kuznets will launch his famous theory, later called the Kuznets curve. According to the American economist, during the industrial and economic modernization (characterized by the transition from agriculture to industry), income inequality follows a bell-like curve, increasing naturally at the beginning until it stabilizes to a certain extent, so that once the economy develops (in the sense of modernization), the gaps are to be reduced (Kuznets 1955 ).
Kuznets's understanding of growing and decreasing income inequality is rather simplified. For Kuznets, income inequalities are the result of changes in economic structures, by passing from an agricultural to an industrial economy. Once the share of the population that worked in agriculture was diminished and will migrate to cities to work in industry, the income gap between farmers and industry workers will be reduced, and the differences will remain only among the employees among the urban population. The latter will be reduced through labour unionization and wage increase.
Economic modernization will bring with it a demographic transition and changes in family patterns (Kuznets 1955) . Thus, income inequality (and its decrease) is the result of structural changes in various economic sectors as economic modernization takes place, and is not the result of specific public To explain the differences between former socialist countries in terms of pace of income inequality growth, Mahutga (2010a, 2010b) argued that there are four major processes which created these differentiations: a) the level of privatization; b) the degree of state support in assuring safety nets; c) the existence of a large ethnic minority and d) the level of foreign investments. According to the two researchers, income inequality is higher in countries where: the share of the private sector is higher 9 ; social public spending is lower; there is at least one ethnic minority with significant share; the foreign direct capital dominates the domestic one.
Bandelj and Mahutga will insist on the latter process to argue how foreign direct investment (FDIs) has helped increase income inequality. First of all, FDIs have penetrated Eastern Europe in sectors such as business, foreign trade and financial services, sectors that require a more skilled workforce and which, due to the technology used, also have higher labour productivity. Second, there are income differences between managers of foreign-owned companies and their employees (Bandelj and Mahutga 2010b ). In conclusion, FDIs can increase income disparities between the economic sectors financed by them and the domestic ones, due to the high productivity and the absorption of skilled workers compared to the semi- If we return to the applicability of Kuznets's curve and consider the studies discussed above, we can conclude that we are witnessing a new trend of growing income inequality that transcends the rural economyindustry dichotomy. The domains `responsible` for growing income inequality are those that provide advanced technologies and services such as communications, insurance and finance -supported by foreign investmentand the main beneficiaries are the employees working in these advanced sectors (as we can also see in Romania's case below).
A global overview of income inequality in Romania
This present study is complementary to a rather burgeoning literature on income inequality and poverty in Romania after 1989. I do not intend to make a review of the large literature that discusses income inequality in Romania, but my intention is rather to highlight some typologies of studies that debate the process discussed. While some studies are more descriptive in their endeavour to highlight the changing structures of inequalities based on rural-urban divisions, labour market participation and educational attainment (e.g. Precupețu 2013), or use inequality and poverty indicators to compare EU's effort in reducing the at risk of poverty rate (Țâra 2013) , other studies use more sophisticated analytical and statistical tools in explaining income inequality. Franco and Gerussi (2013) show the effects of lax trade regulations and FDIs on income inequality. Investments from FDIs can upgrade the technological processes for export production in transition countries, and therefore creates a gap between unskilled and skilled workers. The same type of arguments are used by Mahutga (2010a, 2010b) as I have shown in the previous section. Rose and Viju (2014) take into consideration in their analysis economic (GDP per capita, inflation and FDIs), demographic (the share of rural population, the degree of urbanization, the share of individuals that attained primary education) and political (the degree of privatization, the role of government in reducing inequality, political rights) indicators to explain income inequality and Social Change Review ▪ Winter 2017 ▪ Vol. 15(1-2): conclude that the main factors that contribute to income inequality are the share of the private sector in the economy and inflation (measured as the growth rate of the GDP deflator). Finally, Garnero et al. (2015) analyse how collective bargaining coverage and the mechanism of minimum wage setting affect wage inequality and conclude that Romania, Greece and Portugal offer stronger protection than the majority EU countries with statutory minimum wage due to their relative high bargaining coverage.
My purpose for this article is more modest. I intend to show a global overview of income inequality after 1989 and to pinpoint some macrostructural processes that led to the current situation.
The synthetic measure to reveal income inequality is the Gini coefficient. Gini can take a value between 0 (perfect equality) and 100 if the 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 The ratio between the top and the bottom quintile (S80 / S20) in 2015 was 8.3, the highest value in the EU. Close to this value was Lithuania (7.3)
and Bulgaria with a ratio of 7.1. Other countries in CEE were doing better, with Hungary having a ratio of 4.3, while in Poland the ratio was 4.9, far from the performance of countries like the Czech Republic (3.5) and Slovenia Although being an employee considerably decreases the risk of being in poverty, the wage policy during transition has focused on maintaining a low minimum wage so that Romania remains attractive to foreign investors.
As the figure below from Eurostat shows, the minimum wage in Romania, expressed in Euro 10 , is among the lowest in the EU, being only surpassed by Bulgaria (Figure 7) . Corollary, even in times of economic crisis, the state has virtually left the profits untaxed and moved the burden on the shoulders of employees and consumers. The share of GDP in the different types of taxes clearly indicates the huge difference between the two types of budgetary sources. Figure 6 . The S80/S20 ratio in 2015 8,3 7,5 7,16,9 6,56,5 6,2 6 5,8 5,25,25,25,2 4,94,8 4,34,34,34,24,1 4 3,83,83,83,63,6 3,53,53,53 Source: Romania's Statistical Yearbook (2016) At the same time, the at risk of poverty rate for employees with a contract of limited duration is 12.1% in Romania, below EU 28 (15.6%) and EU10 (17.4%) and two times lower than other CEE countries, such as Hungary (32%) and Bulgaria (24.7%). However, this indicator is less relevant for Romania, as the share of employees with a contract of limited duration is 1% in 2015. Because of Romania's atypical employment structure, with a third of its workforce in informal economy: day labourers, working in subsistence agriculture or unpaid family workers, the last two categories representing 90% of the workforce working in agriculture -the European statistics underrates the share of workers in temporary jobs, since employment without a legal form is by its nature, temporary (Domnișoru 2014, 25 If we take a glance at the differences between annual average net wages earned by employees in different economic sectors, we notice that the lowest wages are to be found in domains such as hotels and restaurants, agriculture and manufacturing, which are followed by construction and trade services. Then, higher incomes are to be found for employees working in real estate, health and social care, education and public administration.
On the next level, at a significant distance from the previous group we find not do` (Stiglitz 2013, 35) . Governments can increase inequalities by masking upward redistribution. Often, these policies reflect government subsidies to economic actors (corporations), laws that make the market less competitive, lax competition, law enforcement, etc. Also, low taxation of dividend tax and capital gains have created a window for the top 1% of the income hierarchy to considerably increase their wealth, as capital and dividends inequities' are much higher than those based on wages (Stiglitz 2013, 96) .
Thus, the history of inequality is not only economic, but also a political one! Turning to Romania, growing income inequality in postsocialism is the result of macro-structural changes in the Romanian economy, but also to political decisions taken during this period. First, Romania's status of a dependent economy has shaped its wage policy all these years. In order to remain attractive to foreign investors, Romania has proposed a minimum wage almost unbeatable throughout the region. More than half of Romania's employees earned less than average wage in 2015, while the share of those who earned more than 1000 euros was below 10%. The flat income tax was intended to help the households save money for further investment, but its effects were not necessarily the ones expected.
The research conducted by Liviu Voinea and Flaviu Mihăescu at the end of 2000, based on the Household Budget Survey, showed that on average, with the introduction of the flat income tax, the gains per employee were 3.73% of his/her net wage and only 2% of the employees gained more than 10% of their wage. Moreover, 10% of the employees received 40% of the gains from the introduction of the flat income tax (Voinea and Mihăescu 2009, 29) . At the same time, the corporate tax was cut from 25 to 16% and in addition, in Romania, there is no wealth tax, while property taxation is rather low (Stănescu and Dumitru 2017, 8) .
Looking at the efforts of other former socialist countries to reduce income inequality, we remarked that, for example, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have managed to maintain their Gini coefficient close to its 1989 value and also to the values of the Scandinavian countries, suggesting that postsocialism does not necessarily lead to growing income inequality.
Corollary to the first conclusion, one more aspect that is worth mentioning is the `shrinking` of the government's social agenda in the face of multinational 
Conclusions
Over the past decades, there has been a widespread concern for comparing income inequality at the European and world level. In this sense, more because of the high share of informal work, remittances from migration, the atypical occupational structure and the importance of own-consumption in reducing inequality, that makes Romania an exceptional case in the EU.
Romania still has a large part of its workforce employed in subsistence agriculture (including unpaid family workers) and informal economy with low and fluctuating incomes. It also has the largest shares of incomes coming from own consumption, reflected in the household income structure (Figure 1 ).
Taking all this into consideration, it is not surprising that Romania became one of EU's most unequal countries. If we look at some classical inequality indicators, we can see that during transition to the market economy, the lower quintile's share of the median disposable income has dropped by half, while the upper quintile's share has grown with almost 10%. Put it in other words, over 40% of national income is held by the upper quintile.
In my endeavour to explain rising income inequality, I critically interrogate Kuznets` famous theory regarding rising income inequality during time of structural changes, by arguing that his theory disregards the effects of specific public policies. As some scholars argued (e.g. Bohle and 
